








THE IMPACT AND ORIGIN OF EMPLOYEE RIGHTS IN 
CHAPTER 6 OF THE COMPANIES ACT 71 OF 2008 
 
By Pippa Faul 
 
Student no:     212561971 




















Contents                                                                                                               Page 
 
i.  Statement                                                                                                              4 
                                                                                                                 
Chapter 1: INTRODUCTION                                                                                     5 
1.1 Statement of the problem                                                                                    5 
1.2 Aim of the study                                                                                                   6 
1.3 Methodology                                                                                                        7 
1.4 Overview of the chapters                                                                                     7 
 
Chapter 2: CORPORATE RESCUE                                                                           8 
 
2.1 The rationale behind corporate rescue                                                                 8 
2.2 The objects of corporate rescue                                                                           9 
2.3 Key elements for an effective rescue system                                                      10 
2.4 Business rescue in South Africa                                                                          12 
2.4.1 Origin and evolution                                                                                          12 
2.4.2 Preservation not liquidation                                                                              14 
2.4.2.1 The Insolvency Amendment Act                                                                    14 
2.4.2.2 The Insolvency and business recovery Bill                                                    16 
2.4.3 Employees - primus inter pares                                                                        18 
 
Chapter 3: THE ORIGINS OF SOUTH AFRCA’S ‘PRO-EMPLOYEE’ BUSINESS 
RESCUE                                                                                                                    20 
 
3.1 A new corporate law                                                                                            20          
3.1.1 The corporate law reform project                                                                      20 
3.1.2 The guidelines                                                                                                  21 
3.1.3 In whose  interest                                                                                             23 
3.1.4 Consultation                                                                                                     24 
3.2 The influence of labour within the socio-political context prevailing during 
corporate law reform                                                                                                 26 





Chapter 4: THE IMPACT OF EMPLOYEE RIGHTS IN CHAPTER 6 ON 
 BUSINESS IN GENERAL AND ON THE RESCUE OF A BUSINESS 
 IN DISTRESS                                                                                                          32 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                 
4.1 The impact of employee rights in Chapter 6 on business in general                  32 
4.2 Employees become active participants in business rescue                                35 
4.2.1 Employee participation, the subject of ongoing debate                                    35 
4.2.1.1 Argument for increased employee participation                                            37 
4.2.1.2 Arguments against increased employee participation                                   39 
4.2.2 Employee participation in the South African context                                        41 
4.2.3 The impact of employee participation in business rescue                                43 
4.2.3.1 ‘Soft voice’ employee participation in business rescue                                  43 
4.2.3.2 The right to information                                                                                  44 
4.2.3.3 ‘Hard voice’ employee participation in business rescue                                45 
4.3 Employee protection and the impact on the flexibility to restructure                    50 
4.4 Employee privilege and the impact on post commencement financing               55 
 
Chapter 5: THE IMPACT OF EMPLOYEE RIGHTS IN CHAPTER 6 ON  
THE RETURN TO CREDITORS AFTER FAILED RESCUE                                     62 
 
5.1 The impact of employee rights in Chapter 6 on the sale of business  
as a going concern                                                                                                    62 
5.2 The impact of employee rights in Chapter 6 on employee claims                       63 
                  
 Chapter 6: CONCLUSION                                                                                        66 
 
Chapter 7: BIBLIOGRAPHY                                                                                      70 
 
7.1 Secondary sources                                                                                              70 
7.2 Table of cases                                                                                                     74 





i   STATEMENT 
 
I, Pippa Faul, declare that this mini-thesis is my own work. It is presented in partial 
fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Laws (LLM) in the Faculty 
of Law, University of Kwa-Zulu Natal. It has not been submitted for any other degree 
or examination at any other University. I further declare that I have obtained the 
































1.1 Statement of the problem 
 
Business rescue was introduced in large part to keep the “productive capacity of  
(the) economy … intact”1 at a time when South Africa was in recession and suffering 
from an ever increasing trend in insolvencies which was socially and economically 
harmful. An effective rescue mechanism was required to limit this growing problem.   
 
However, in spite of the apparent success of the rescue procedure in reducing the 
number of insolvencies, questions have recently been raised about the effectiveness 
of Chapter 6 of the Act (hereinafter referred to as Chapter 6) in preserving the 
“productive capacity” of deserving businesses in distress and reversing the 
destructive impact of insolvencies in these cases.  
.  
Recent statistics released by the CPIC on business rescue2, have revealed that 
there have been 1398 applications for business rescue since the inception of the 
procedure to July 2014.  During this same period there have been 4029 
insolvencies.3 If the number of insolvencies is added to the number of business 
rescue applications it can be roughly calculated that around 5400 businesses were in 
distress during this period. Of this number, only 172 are recorded as having had 
‘substantial implementation or completion of the rescue plan’4, amounting to an 
impact of a little over 3% on all businesses in distress. 
The number of businesses restored to viable ‘productive capacity’ within this total, in 
terms of the primary objective of Chapter 6, is even lower because a plan, described 
in the report as substantially completed, may have had to resort to the secondary 
objective of a better return for creditors, which amounts to little more than a “glorified 
                                                          
1
 I le ROUX, K Duncan ‘The naked truth: creditor understanding of business rescue: A small business 
perspective’ (2013) 6 SAJESBM 58 
2
 L Ensor ‘Business rescue under scrutiny as remedies fail to save stricken firms’,  Business Day Live 06 August 
2014 available at http://www.bdlive.co.za/business/2014/08/06/business-rescue-under-scrutiny-as-remedies-
fail-to-save-stricken-firms accessed on 30 August 2014 
3
 Statistics South Africa  Statistics of liquidations and insolvencies (Preliminary) (2014) 2 Figure 1- number of 
liquidations 
4
 Ensor (note 2 above)  
6 
 
liquidation”5 having no greater impact on the economy than a distortion of the 
insolvency statistics. 
Although the statistics do not reveal details on the businesses that were liquidated, it 
is safe to assume that there must have been more than 3% of the total number of 
businesses in distress that would have been eligible to have had “productive 
capacity” restored through an effective rescue mechanism. 
 
These results have prompted the Government via the Department of Trade and 
Industry, to appoint a special committee under the chairmanship of Michael Katz to 
“study the dynamics of the system”6 
 
There can be many reasons for this underwhelming performance, some of which 
include the fact that the legislation is still very new, the corporate culture of South 
Africa is still very creditor friendly as opposed to the debtor friendly culture in the 
USA,7 and that a rescue culture still has to develop where the concept of debt 
forgiveness needs to take root.8 
However, there is also criticism that “excessive”9 employee rights contained in 
Chapter 6 have led to an imbalance in the treatment of stakeholders, creating 
commercial distortions and uncertainties, which may be undermining the success of 
the rescue procedure.  
 
1.2 Aim of the study 
 
This study aims to examine the specific impact of these rights on business in general 
and upon the efficiency of the rescue procedure in achieving its objectives. 
It will be important to understand why the interests of employees received this 
special protection and a study of the background and origin of these rights will be 
undertaken.   
                                                          
5
 ‘Usefulness of Business Rescue in Spotlight’ Legal Brief Today 06 August 2014 available at 




 W du Preez The Status of Post Commencement Financing for Business rescue South Africa (unpublished 
thesis, Gordon Institute of Business Science, University of Pretoria, 2012) 114 
8
 ibid  
9
 A Loubser  Some Comparative Aspects of Corporate Rescue in South African Company Law (unpublished LLD 





The research methodology employed has been largely based on secondary research 
with extensive reliance made on published articles, reports and existing research on 
the topic of business rescue. 
 
1.3 Overview of the chapters 
 
Chapter 2 provides a background to the rationale of business rescue in modern 
corporate law and describes the essential features that constitute a successful 
procedure. This provides context for the examination of the development of the 
South African procedure and the extent to which it was successful in developing 
those elements required to produce a successful rescue model.  
 
Chapter 3 examines the origins of employee rights in Chapter 6 with specific focus 
on the influence of the underlying policy shifts in corporate law in compliance with 
the new constitutional democracy. The broadened participation of stakeholders in the 
legislative process as a result thereof, is examined with particular focus on the 
powerful role of labour. This extraordinary influence, as evidenced by the substantial 
gains made by employees in Chapter 6, is examined in the context of the vacillating 
power relations in the post-apartheid socio-political environment.   
 
Chapters 4 and 5 evaluate the impact of these rights on business in general and the 
objectives of business rescue and a comparison is made with employee rights in 
other jurisdictions to assess the extent to which South African employees are 











2.  Corporate Rescue 
 
2.1 The rationale behind corporate rescue 
 
Social attitudes towards the sanction for insolvency have come a long way since the 
practice in Ancient Greece of amputating a debtor’s limbs or selling him into 
slavery.10   
 
The modern trend to cast insolvency as an economic rather than a moral failure11 
with debtor protection taking the place of debtor repression12 can trace its roots to 
the 18th century collapse of the railway industry in the United States of America 
where the courts recognised that greater value was realised in the selling of a 
business in distress as a going concern rather than the piecemeal realisation of its 
assets.13 
Apart from an improved value proposition, the new approach supported the concept 
of a “fresh start” necessary for the development of the entrepreneurial spirit that 
characterises the US economy. 
 
These early developments in the US law of insolvency culminated in the “debtor-in-
possession model” contained in the 1978 Bankruptcy code which is recognised as 
one of the leading corporate rescue systems upon which many other rescue systems 








                                                          
10
 C Bridge ‘ Insolvency – A second chance? Why modern insolvency laws seek to promote business rescue’ 
Law in transition report for EBRD (2013) 28-41 available at www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/law/lit13e.pdf 
37 
11
 ibid 32 quoting B H Mann ‘Bankruptcy in the Age of American Independence’ 2009 Harvard University Press  
12
 ibid 32 quoting P Wood Principles of International Insolvency 2 ed (2007)  (Sweet & Maxwell for biblio)  
13
 ibid 33 
14
 ibid 33 
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2.2 The objects of corporate rescue 
 
The philosophy behind corporate rescue which differs according to the policy context 
of the different jurisdictions, generally dictates the emphasis and priority of the 
various objects of corporate rescue.15  
 
The common denominator across all jurisdictions however, is the recognition of the 
economic benefits arising from the rescue of deserving businesses upon which 
national economies are heavily reliant.  
In addition, many jurisdictions are motivated by the spirit of entrepreneurialism which 
rescue procedures foster, allowing risk- takers, the life-blood of vibrant economies, a 
second chance, which is likely to be more successful because of lessons learnt 
before.16  
In France however, the objective of entrepreneurialism is subordinated to the social 
consideration of employment preservation whilst in Ireland, state protectionism 
trumped entrepreneurialism as a key motivator for the development of corporate 
rescue, to save an industry which was important to the national interest.17 
 
In many jurisdictions another important object of corporate rescue is to provide a 
better return to creditors than would have been the case if an enterprise in distress 
was immediately liquidated. It is likely that this object features so prominently across 
the various jurisdictions because it is necessary to incentivise creditors to support 
rescue and not seek the conventional remedy of liquidation. 
 
The UNICTRAL draft legislative guide on insolvency law18 specifically recognises 
that there are many objects of corporate rescue which often represent a reflection 
the competing interests of various parties.  
 
                                                          
15
 Bridge (note 10 above;34)  
16
 ibid 35  
17
 ibid  The Irish“rescue procedure… was introduced in 1990 at a time when the Goodman Group of 
companies, of strategic importance to the Irish beef industry, seemed to be in a state of imminent collapse..” 
18




It proposes that a balancing of these objects will generally be the primary objective 
for most jurisdictions.19  
In his paper on corporate rescue in 2004, Burdette discussed the difficulty in 
balancing these interests and predicted that the South African drafters of business 
rescue would face a challenge in balancing the interests of employment protection 
with the economic necessity of downsizing a business in distress.20  
The accuracy of this prediction will become evident as this study progresses. 
 
2.3 Key elements for an effective rescue system 
 
There are many important elements that constitute an effective rescue mechanism 
some of which are listed in UNICTRAL guide as; 
 
 “Submission of the debtor to the rescue proceedings… 
 Automatic and mandatory moratorium… 
 Continuation of the business of the debtor… and 
 The formulation of a plan” and acceptance and implementation thereof21 
 
As part of “the formulation of a plan,” one of the most important aspects in this 
process is the securing of fresh capital. The reason for this is that the main ground 
upon which business rescue is initiated, particularly in South Africa, is financial 
distress which generally arises from a lack of liquidity. A fresh capital infusion is thus 
vital in most instances to reinvigorate the business. Without this, rescue, in most 
cases, would be an exercise in futility. 
 
Wanya du Preez states in her thesis on post-commencement financing; 
 
Therefore one of the critical components of the business rescue plan 
involves securing turnaround finance to meet short-term trade 
obligations (such as working capital requirements), covering 
                                                          
19
 DA Burdette The development of a modern and effective business rescue model for South Africa (a pre-
consultation working document presented by The Centre for Advanced Corporate Insolvency Law, University 
of Pretoria, 2004)18 
20
 ibid  
21
 ibid 25,26 
11 
 
turnaround/restructuring costs, and restoring the company’s balance 
sheet to solvency22 
 
In addition to access to fresh funds, speed and efficiency in the process is also very 
important to limit ongoing losses of a business in distress and set it once more on a 
healthy trajectory. This requirement is recognised in Section 7(k) of the Act which 
states that the purpose of the Act is to provide for “the efficient rescue and recovery 
of financially distressed companies.”  
 
Burdette emphasises this in his proposals for the development of a modern and 
effective corporate rescue for South Africa, claiming that; 
 
Invariably speed will be one of the most important factors that can 
save a viable business, and unnecessary delays could defeat the very 
purpose of the business rescue provisions23 
 
In further support of the importance of an expedited process, Anneli Loubser in her 
dissertation on business rescue, quotes from an article by K Schmidt in her 
proposals for insolvency reforms where she states that; “Best rescues took place 
silently and quickly.”24 
 
Cassim notes that the sooner a business in distress submits itself to the process of 
rescue, the better the chances for success and in this regard he quotes from the 
Cork report on insolvency law reforms in the UK where it states that ; 
 
The earlier a company reorganises itself, the better the chances of 
success and avoidance of liquidation.25 
 
In essence rescue laws need to create a mechanism whereby, a viable company in 
distress can submit at an early stage to a rescue system that has an automatic 
moratorium, where an efficient practitioner can swiftly and decisively implement a 
                                                          
22
 du Preez (note 7 above;6  quoting from Corporate Renewal Solutions. (2011a) Turnaround funding and 
financial restructuring available at 
www.turnaroundsa.com/turnaround%20strategy/turnaround%20funding.php)  
23
 Burdette (note 19 above; 33)  
24
 Loubser(note 9 above; 309  quoting from K Schmidt ‘Insolvenzrechtsreform nach dem 54. Deutschen 
Juristentag’ (1982)Zeitschrift fur konkurs-, Treuhand-und schiedsgericht-wesen 613) 
25
 FH Cassim…et al Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2012)862 
12 
 
plan in conjunction with existing management, to secure post-commencement 
financing and restructure the business to restore profitability. 
 
This ideal will serve as a useful reference in the analysis of the impact of employee 
rights on the efficiency of the South African procedure.  
 
2.4 Business rescue in South Africa 
 
The new business rescue mechanism in South Africa was motivated in large part by 
the severe impact of insolvency upon employees and the burgeoning unemployment 
rate and the fact that the existing rescue mechanism was ineffectual.  
 
2.4.1 Origin and evolution 
 
Although South Africa was a trailblazer in the field of corporate rescue having been 
one of the first corporate law regimes to have a rescue mechanism, judicial 
management had proved to be an inefficient vehicle disparagingly referred to in Le 
Roux Hotel Management (Pty) Ltd v E Rand (Pty) Ltd as “a system which has barely 
worked since its initiation in 1926.”26 
There is some debate however as to whether judicial management should have 
been abandoned. The de Vries Commisssion27 maintained that the principal problem 
with the process was that there was no reliable system in place to determine the 
viability of the business applying for judicial management. An amendment to rectify 
this shortcoming was in the view of the Commission, all that was required, not the 
outright repeal of the process.28 
Whilst technically this might probably have been correct, judicial management had 
suffered significant reputational damage over the years and a ‘new brand’ was 
                                                          
26
 Loubser (note 9 above;3 quoting from Le Roux Hotel Management (Pty) Ltd v E Rand (Pty) Ltd [2001] 1 All SA 
223 (C) at 238) describing the inefficiency of judicial management, the previous rescue system in S.A 
27
 ibid quoting from The Commission of Enquiry into the Companies Act appointed in 1963 under the 
chairmanship of Mr Justice J Van Wyk de Vries: see Cilliers, Benade et al Corporate Law par 2.15.) 
28
 G M Museta  The Development of Business Rescue in South African Law (Unpublished LLM thesis. University 
of Pretoria, 2011) 19 
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needed to transform perception that the rescue of a business in distress was an 
automatic “kiss of death.”29  
  
There were a number of attempts to address the impotence of judicial management 
the first of which was during the process of overhauling the insolvency legislation.  
 
There was a key focus placed on the rescue of businesses in the draft Insolvency 
and Business Recovery Bill30 with numerous recommendations made by all 
stakeholders. In addition, a two billion rand fund was proposed to be made available 
to assist businesses in distress.31  
However these initiatives were abandoned when it was decided that a business 
rescue mechanism was to form part of a new Companies Act that was being 
developed in the corporate legislative reform.32 
 
According to Anneli Loubser, South Africa in particular, in a low growth, high 
unemployment environment needed an effective mechanism to improve the survival 
rate of companies and reverse the liquidation culture33 prevalent in the country.  
The statistics revealed a grim picture. Over a ten year period from 1993 to 2003, 
insolvencies had increased by 57% which Anneli Loubser described as “close to a 





                                                          
29
 ‘Business rescue under the new Companies Act is an improvement over judicial management’ 
http://www.roodtinc.com/newsletter78.asp, accessed on 30 May 2014  
30
 Labour submission to NEDLAC on the insolvency and business recovery Bill ,11 May 2004 
31
 A Loubser ‘The Interaction Between Corporate Rescue and Labour Legislation: Lessons to be Drawn from the 
South African Experience’ (2004) 14(1) International Insolvency Review 58 
32
 Loubser (note 9 above; 5)  
33
 A Loubser Tilting at Windmills (unpublished lecture notes ,UNISA,2011) 11 where she quotes from a paper 
presented at a symposium with the theme ‘Bankruptcy in the Global Village’ “The topic of this  conference 
suggests that a developed rescue culture is more civilized than a liquidation culture, and that we should all 
pray to be blessed with a Chapter 11.” 
An explanation of the term ‘liquidation culture’ is found in the University of Pretoria, Faculty of Law Final 
report containing proposals on a unified insolvency Act (200) quoting Smits in the Corporate administration in 
De Jure (1999)80 “It would appear that it is far easier to liquidate a company and start a new one, than to try 
and save an existing business.”  
34
 Loubser (note 31 above; 58)  
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2.4.2 Preservation not liquidation 
 
Liquidations generally have a devastating impact on employees where they are, 
according to Alice Belcher ; “in some ways the lost souls in insolvency law.”35 
 
Employees are particularly vulnerable in insolvencies because wages generally 
constitute the only source of income for employees36 and this is exacerbated in a 
country with low employment prospects and a relatively poorly developed welfare 
system. 
Peter Carolus states that; 
 
It is not an exaggeration to say that the financial security of employees 
is sometimes so closely related to the stability of a company that the 
insolvency of the latter means financial disaster for its labour force.37 
 
It therefore comes as no surprise that the problem of employee vulnerability in 
insolvencies was high on the labour agenda which was to prove highly influential in 
the development of the rescue procedure. 
Valuable insights into this agenda are revealed in its response to the amendments to 
the Insolvency Law and the Insolvency and Business recovery Bill. 
 
2.4.2.1 The Insolvency Amendment Act  
 
This was enacted to rectify the low levels of protection afforded to employees in 
insolvencies.  
Employee rights to information, participation and protection were improved.  
Under the new amendments, employers experiencing financial distress were 
required to inform employees and provide opportunities for participation in decisions 
to downsize the workforce. 
Greater protection of employees was provided in the ranking of employee claims 
where unpaid salaries and benefits, although capped at a certain amount, received 
                                                          
35
 Cassim (note 25 above;884 quoting Alice Belcher Corporate Rescue:A Conceptual Approach to Insolvency 
Law (1997)4) 
36
 P Carolus,T G Tiemeni,K Ziervogel 2007 ‘Effects on the employment relationship of the insolvency of the 
employer: A worker perspective’Law, Democracy and Development 109 
37
 ibid 110 
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better protection, ranking 5th, behind, inter alia, secured creditors and the costs of the 
insolvency. 
Additional protection was provided with respect to employment contracts which were 
no longer automatically terminated on formal insolvency but suspended for a period 
of 45 day after the appointment of a liquidator allowing for the transfer of these 
contracts in the event of a sale of the insolvent business.38 
 
Although this presented a considerable improvement for employees, labour believed 
these rights did not go far enough and still regarded the insolvency legislation as 
harsh and unfair on employees.39   
 
In addition, labour was dissatisfied with a perceived bias towards secured creditors 
in the legislation and by the liquidators40 where, in its view, the satisfaction of 
secured debt very often resulted in an insufficient free residue to settle workers 
claims.  
 
Although some employee protection had been introduced with regard  to 
employment contracts which were no longer automatically cancelled, the relief 
provided by the suspension thereof for 45 days was generally more of an illusion 
than a practical benefit, where it is said that generally employees merely; “witness 
the countdown of what can be referred to as industrial euthanasia”41 without 
remuneration. 
 
Another criticism of the amendments by labour, was that its dissatisfaction with the 
ease of embarking upon liquidation had not been addressed. For instance, the power 
of a single creditor to liquidate an otherwise solvent business on the basis of an ‘act 
of insolvency,’ had been left unaltered.  
 
                                                          
38
 T Joubert, S van Eck & D Burdette ‘Impact of Labour Law on South Africa's New Corporate Rescue 
Mechanism’ (2011) 27 (1)  International Journal of Comparative Labour Law and Industrial Relations 7  
39
 Carolus (note 36 above;110)  
40
 ibid 114 
41
 ibid 116 
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Similarly, abuse of the insolvency laws was still possible through voluntary 
liquidations and the movement of assets by reorganization and restructuring of 
corporations. 
 
Employee impotence in the procedure was therefore a source of deep concern to 
labour. 
 
Carolus, articulating the voice of organized labour, proposed inter alia, the following 
recommendations, in order to rectify the shortcomings of the amendments; 
 A compulsory disclosure of a company’s financial affairs to workers 
 Criminal and civil liability to attach to directors for fraud and recklessness and 
 The prioritization of employee claims.42 
 
These recommendations together with measure to address the impotence of 
employees in a business in distress, would feature high on labour’s agenda in the 
development of the new business rescue procedure. 
 
2.4.2.2 The Insolvency and Business Recovery Bill  
 
Around the same time the Government produced the Insolvency and Business 
Recovery Bill which was based on the recommendations in reports by the South 
African Law Commission and the Standing Advisory Committee on Company Law. 
This was tabled at NEDLAC in 2003 and the bill was presented by the Department of 
Justice and Constitutional Development to the Labour Market Chamber on 28 July 
2003 and 23 November 2006 where a task team composed of government, business 
and labour was established to review the Bill.43  
Although there were no specifics on the rescue procedure, it is revealing to note the 
disagreement between labour on the one side and business and government on the 
other with regard to the prioritisation of employee claims in insolvency proceedings. 
 
Labour supported the concept of super preference for salary claims, stating; 
                                                          
42
 Carolus (note 36 above;118) 
43





employees lose, not only wages, leave pay and long service bonus, 
but also their contributions to the workers medical aid and retirement 
funds which the employer has not yet paid over…(and) proposes that 
in respect of wages and other benefits workers should be ranked 
above all secured creditors.44 
 
Business was opposed to this prioritisation, claiming; 
 
claims for salary, etc, can be of such a magnitude that it will simply 
wipe out the securities; this would work against the whole scheme of 
credit supply and have a devastating effect on the economy.45 
 
 
The Law Commission agreed with business and stated; 
 
A super-preference or secured status by means of devices such as 
statute created security devices is not advisable. It is predicted with 
confidence that investments in companies with substantial work forces 
would be discouraged substantially if wages and other benefits of 
workers are ranked above secured creditors. On balance this will 
probably do more harm than good to workers in general.46 
 
The comments on this proposal are concluded as follows; 
 
 Government and Business submits that a super preference for salary 
claims is not advisable. 
 Labour supports a preference above secured creditors.47 
 
Whilst this commentary on the Bill does not specifically deal with business rescue, it, 
also provides a valuable insight into the influence of the agenda of labour that was to 






                                                          
44
 Labour submission to NEDLAC (note 30 above; 29) 
45
 ibid 29 
46





2.4.3 Employees – primus inter pares 
 
Inasmuch as there was dissatisfaction by some that the Insolvency Act contained too 
little employee protection, the new rescue provisions were accused by others of 
containing too much. 
It would appear that Chapter 6 had become the site of rectification for all the 
shortcomings in employee protection in the Insolvency Act.  
 
As previously discussed, an effective corporate rescue system achieves a balance 
between the competing interests of the various stakeholders and it is in this regard 
that the South African rescue system has come under fire with many believing that 
the interests of employees have been prioritised above other stakeholders.  
   
Cassim describes South African corporate rescue as “pro-employee”48 with many 
instances where the interests of employees override “creditor-wealth 
maximisation.”49 
This is in stark contrast to labour’s criticism of the Insolvency Act’s bias towards 
creditors.  
 
Anneli Loubser describes some employee rights as; “excessive .…(with) no 
equivalent in any other comparable system”50, whilst Joubert maintains that; 
 
the provisions are too obviously skewed in favour of the employees, 
and not enough emphasis is placed on the primary objective of the 




In the final analysis the overprotection of employee rights may have 
the unintended result of being to the detriment of the employees, 
essentially making a mockery of South Africa’s new corporate rescue 
mechanism.52 
 
                                                          
48
 Cassim (note 25 above; 899) 
49
 ibid 885,899 
50
 Loubser(note 9 above;53) 
51





It is important to remember when considering the comments on this excessive 
employee protection, that the policy guidelines for the Act provide that Chapter 6 is 
to be based on the rescue system in the USA; “In particular, the provisions of the US 
Chapter 11 will be considered”53 
 
 Chapter 11 operates within one of the strongest free market systems in the world, 
predicated inter alia upon highly flexible labour laws. 
 
It will therefore be important to examine the origin of these rights, to understand the 
reasons why, in adapting this system to the South African environment, the 
employee rights that were provided resemble those found in socialist, co-ordinated 
market economies rather than those contained in the US system upon which 
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 GN 468 of GG 26493,  23/06/2004 ;45 
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3. The origins of South Africa’s “pro-employee” business rescue 
 
A fundamental underpin in the transition from apartheid to a new South African 
society was the concept of broad-based democracy which needed to be extended to 
all areas of society through legislation.54  
 
In this regard it is important to study the process involved in the promulgation of the 
new Companies Act to gain an understanding of some of the more important 
influences which shaped the Act in general and the rescue provisions in particular. 
 
An examination of the socio-political context within which this corporate reform took 
place will also provide valuable insight into the origin of these employee rights. 
.    
3.1 A new corporate law  
 
3.1.1 The corporate law reform project 
 
The advent of the new constitutional democracy in South Africa necessitated a 
comprehensive legislative overhaul of existing legislation. The Companies Act 61 of 
1973, which had fallen out of step with developments in the world and more 
particularly with South Africa in its transition to a modern democratic state, was 
targeted for reform. 
In addition, South Africa needed to develop a robust and rapidly expanding economy 
to alleviate a large socio-economic backlog that had developed under apartheid. 
Companies, as the engine room of growth, required a modern and effective 
regulatory environment within which to flourish. 
The old Companies Act55 where attempts to keep pace with change had led to 
patchy and incremental reform56 which had created ambiguities and conflict in the 
‘underlying philosophy and policy’57 leading to a complex and opaque corporate law 
regime, was the very antithesis of what was required for robust economic growth. 
                                                          
54
 R van der Walt ‘Have workplace forums contributed to worker participation? Some  
management perceptions’ (2008)39(2) South Africa Journal of Business Management 45 
55
 61 0f 1973 
56





A mere tinkering of the Act would no longer suffice, because in the words of Cassim;  
 
Legislation that has outlived its usefulness and is stifling development 
of the economy must be replaced.58  
 
In 2004, the Department of Trade and Industry was charged with the responsibility of 
leading the process of corporate law reform, with the objective of developing a “clear, 
facilitating, predictable and consistently enforced governing law”59  the culmination of 
which would be the new Companies Act of which Chapter 6 would be a key feature. 
 
3.1.2 The guidelines 
 
The first step in the process of Corporate Law reform was to provide, according 
Tshepo Mongalo, the project manager of the process, a policy framework which 
would inform and guide the legislative process.60  
Local and international reference teams were established to “advise on policy and 
legislative consistency”61 and produce guidelines for this corporate reform.  
These policies and guidelines would play a significant role in the development and 
shape of Chapter 6 which would come to reflect the problems of trying to balance 
irreconcilable objectives.  
 
The intention to contextualise these reforms within the constitutional environment of 
the new South African Society was an important object of the Guidelines where it is 
stated that; 
 
No area of South African law can be analysed or evaluated without 
recourse to the Constitution.62 
 
Whilst the necessity for constitutional harmonisation in corporate reform cannot be 
doubted, it was never to be an easy task because of the inherent competition which 
often exists between business objectives and the objectives of social justice.  
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On the one hand the Guidelines recognised, that capital is mobile because of global 
competition,63 and that corporate laws need to create a; 
 
fertile environment for economic activity…(where there should be 
sensitivity to the fact that) economic citizens…respond to a wide range 
of incentives and disincentives.64  
 
 On the other hand, the Guidelines enjoin a “social responsiveness” in line with the 
“socio-political and economic change in South Africa”65  where it is proposed that the 
new company law should be a vehicle “to create a democratic society based on 
equity (and) equality”66 with specific mention that this new law should enhance 
“equity in employment….(through)‘decisive government intervention.”67 
 
Unfortunately it is often the case that, “mobile capital” is often “dis-incentivised” by 
“decisive government interventions.”  
 
Understanding the potential contradictions in the various objectives, the Guidelines 
propose somewhat optimistically, that there should be a balancing of the “competing 
interests of economic actors”68  
 
However it appears that the “unbalanced”69 employee protection in Chapter 6, would 
indicate, according to critics, that the resultant policy was unable to satisfactorily 
chart a coherent course between the proposed social reforms and the often harsh 




                                                          
63
 GN 468 (note 53 above;13,15)“The overriding issue for any market-based economy is vibrant capital 
formation and deployment….We now live in a world of greater globalisation…fast changing markets, greater 
competition for capital’  
64
 ibid 13 
65
 ibid 15 
66
 ibid 16  
67
 ibid 11  
68
 ibid 10 
69
 Joubert (note 38 above; 2) 
70
 ibid 17 
23 
 
3.1.3 In whose interest 
 
In the process of reforming corporate policy it was inevitable that the question of in 
whose interest a company should be run would arise, in determining the new 
corporate philosophy. The outcome of the debate and subsequent adoption of a 
uniquely South African approach to this question, is of significant importance in the 
understanding of the origins of South Africa’s pro-labour rescue provisions.  
 
In South Africa, where capital formation and corporate ownership continue to follow 
racial lines71, the constitutional principles of equity and equality required that 
corporate law would need to move away from the traditional raison d’etre of a 
company for shareholder value and explore a more inclusive approach for all 
stakeholders.  
 
The Guidelines consider the three most common approaches to the question. The 
first of these is the traditional “in the interest of the shareholder” approach72 where 
the primary focus of the company is the on the maximisation of the interests of the 
shareholder at the exclusion of the interests of other stakeholders. The previous 
Companies Act was modelled around this approach.  
 
The second, more radical departure from the “shareholder interests” approach can 
be found in the “pluralist” approach which espouses an egalitarian conceptualisation 
of power and interests across all stakeholders in a company where is no primacy of 
the interests of any one group of stakeholders.73  
 
A third, more moderate departure from the shareholder interest approach is found in 
the “enlightened shareholder value”74 approach which seeks to recognise the 
interests of the other stakeholders because in doing so this will ultimately maximise 
the value to shareholders. 
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Whilst accepting that the enlightened shareholder approach would be the most 
appropriate for the South African corporate legal environment, the Guidelines 
stressed however, that this approach needed to be further developed to conform to 
the dictates of South Africa’s constitutional democracy.75 
 
In this regard it was proposed that although the corporate focus should be on the 
economic success of the business, this goal could in certain circumstances be 
subordinated to; 
 
policies and principles that are reflected in the constitution76( where) 
the company's pursuit of economic objectives should be constrained 
by social and environmental imperatives77 
 
The result of this constitutional harmonisation of corporate law therefore creates 
circumstances when stakeholders acquire an independent value, in other words a 
value that is not dependent upon the furthering of shareholder interests, where;  
 
Directors may, in certain situations, have a specific duty to promote 
the stakeholders’ interests (such as employee welfare78) as ends in 
themselves79 
 
The South African model has therefore modified the enlightened shareholder 
approach to include pluralist elements under some circumstances. 
 
It is likely that this hybridisation of the enlightened shareholder approach provided 
the legislative latitude to attend to the specific needs of employees of a business in 




The policy guidelines were also the product of a democratisation of the legislative 
procedure as reflected in the intention by the Department of Trade and Industry to 
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include a broad range of economic actors in the process of corporate law reform to 
ensure that in the consultative phase, all voices across the economic spectrum were 
heard,80  
 
At the round table of 11 and 12 July 2003, the DDG made it clear that 
the process was going to be as broadly inclusive as possible81 
 
In addition to this widely consultative approach with a broad range of economic and 
social stakeholders, the reform of corporate law fell within the realm of economic 
policy and was therefore subject to a statutory consultations process with NEDLAC82 
in terms of the National Economic Development and Labour Council Act 35 of 1994. 
 
NEDLAC is made up of four groups representing the interests of labour, community 
and development, business, and government and has been constituted to; 
 
consider all significant changes to social and economic policy before it 
is implemented or introduced in Parliament.83  
 
 
In light of the significant gains made by employees in Chapter 6, it is the influence of 
labour in NEDLAC that will be the most important to examine, particularly as it has 
been an influential force in legislative processes, even during the apartheid era, 
through the strategic use of the power of numerical strength.84 
 
Prior to the formation of NEDLAC, during the late 1980’s and early 1990's the main 
unions organised into a negotiating entity which primarily served to wield influence in 
the field of labour law through the thwarting of proposed legislative reform by the 
illegitimate apartheid state.85 
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This power obtained through obstruction by organised labour was, however, to 
change in NEDLAC where the central purpose and objective of this new body was 
creative, requiring all groups to positively influence policy on economic and social 
matters before being presented to parliament.’86 
 
It is in this role that labour would have been enabled to influence policy and make 
proposals and recommendations relating to the protection of employees in  
Chapter 6. 
 
It is important to note that organised labour, through its status as a partner to the 
ruling party in the tripartite alliance, potentially has additional power to advance an 
agenda that promotes its interests87 
However the extent to which it is able to exert this influence is according to Gostner 
and Joffe, dependent; “on the power relations between the social partners”88   
 
It is these “power relations” that require further investigation to determine the extent 
of labour’s influence at the time of the legislative process which produced the 
employment rights in Chapter 6. 
 
3.2 The influence of labour within the socio-political context prevailing during 
corporate law reform 
 
The “pro-employee” character of Chapter 6 suggests considerable influence on the 
process by organised labour operating within an environment that was receptive to 
the promotion of social justice. 
 
It will therefore be useful to examine the politics and power struggles of the 
competing ideologies dominating the post-apartheid period in order to trace the 
development of the influence of labour in promoting its agenda at the time of the 
enactment of Chapter 6 of the Act. 
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3.2.1 An ideological contest 
 
The power of labour to promote its agenda has waxed and waned in the fluctuating 
power relations of post-apartheid South Africa which has been an ideological 
battleground between ‘rival visions of economic development.’89  
 
The pre-1994 apartheid state which was capitalist in nature favoured the capital 
formation of the white minority largely at the expense of black South Africans 
through, according to Sampie Terblanche, the; “systemic exploitation and structural 
injustices towards people other than white.”90 
 
The focus and tendency during this period was on the concentration of institutional 
economic power amongst the white minority with scant regard for conditions of 
employment or human development.91  
There were some concessions towards labour during this period, namely the de-
racialisation of collective bargaining from 1979 which permitted black labour to 
“participate in industry-level bargaining”92 which was largely achieved through the 
power of labour’s numerical strength. 93 
It was not surprising that the workplace became a potent representation of the 
apartheid state and a natural arena to galvanise the anti-apartheid struggle. 
 
The transition in 1994, from a racially polarised society, produced a new struggle 
based on the pursuit of economic hegemony between those pursuing a market 
economy ideology and others pursuing a socialist policy agenda. 
 
Although there have been significant structural changes in institutional power 
relations in the post-apartheid society, there is still marked social inequality in South 
African society where; “two economies” appear to persist in this country.  
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The first is an advanced, sophisticated economy, based on skilled 
labour, which is becoming more globally competitive. The second is a 
mainly informal, marginalised, unskilled economy, populated by the 
unemployed and those unemployable in the formal sector.94 
 
To a very large extent this “informal, marginalised, unskilled economy” is 
represented by organised labour which pursues a socialist agenda that envisions an 
interventionist state with labour-friendly policies.95 This was also the policy of the 
ANC prior to and immediately after its unbanning. 
The socialist camp at that stage, which was made up of the ANC, the SACP and 
COSATU consolidated their ties through the creation of the tripartite alliance where 
the ANC was from the outset the uncontested leader, until it began to diverge 
ideologically from the other two partners.96   
Although it is unclear what precipitated the gradual move by the ANC away from its 
socialist ideology towards a capitalist, neoliberal policy, it may have had something 
to do with the collapse of the Soviet Union which had been very influential during the 
apartheid era with the members that made up the tripartite alliance.97  
Whatever the reasons might have been, this shift marked the beginning of damaging 
internal conflict in the alliance that has intensified steadily since then. 
 
Initially the SACP and COSATU were very influential in the alliance and played a 
major role in the development of the Reconstruction and Development Plan (RDP) 
which was imbued with socialist strategies with pro-labour policies.98 
 
The formation of NEDLAC during this period represented one of the biggest 
achievements for labour. Set up to ensure that “state policy does not compromise 
the interests of the working people”99 
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This influence of labour however weakened during the height of Mbeki’s power 
where, by 1996 the cracks had widened further in the alliance. Mbeki, who at that 
time was deputy president, was steadily moving economic policy along a more neo-
liberal trajectory100 which envisioned flexible labour policies, very little state 
interference, and reliance on the market to regulate the economy. 
This new approach was to find full expression in GEAR,101 the plan that was to 
replace the RDP. 
Unlike its predecessor which was a symbol of economic policy compromise and 
inclusive negotiation, GEAR was the product of a team of highly skilled experts. It 
was presented as a fait accompli and predictably the remaining partners of the 
alliance felt excluded and marginalised.102  
Whilst it can be argued that the process could have been more inclusive there is 
almost no doubt that the impracticalities of the RDP had precipitated this new 
trajectory which saw in GEAR a greater reliance being made on the supposed 
“automatic and efficient forces of the market.”103 
A central feature of GEAR was the adherence to “sound fiscal, monetary and labour 
policies.”104 Social spending would therefore be subordinated to the health of the 
fiscus and the labour market would become more flexible. Both these cornerstones 
of GEAR were, however, inimical to the alliance’s left leaning partners. 
The lack of consultation and outright disregard of the serious objections of COSATU 
and the SACP in the production of this new policy was a clear indication of Mbeki’s 
increasingly “centralised leadership…and the (gradual) decline in influence”105 of the 
socialist camp in the alliance.  
This inevitably led to increased acrimony where Mbeki came under intense pressure 
from the left.  
 
From as early as 2005, just after the commencement of the corporate law reform 
project, the sustained attacks on the neoliberal agenda showed signs of bearing fruit.  
After the initial benefits afforded by the neoliberal policies, in particular the steadying 
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of the macro-economy, there was a steady decline in the “strict adherence to the 
GEAR model as a consequence of criticisms from various quarters”106 
 
The socialist coalition within the ANC, long side-lined and silenced by Mbeki, 
increased the pressure and mounted a concerted campaign to remove Mbeki and 
install someone who they believed would be more sympathetic to their cause.107 
The Polokwane conference in 2007 marked the peak of the campaign against the 
neoliberal agenda. Mbeki was unceremoniously removed thereafter and Jacob 
Zuma, promoted as a champion of the socialist left and a friend of the worker, was 
swept to power in the ANC, on a strong labour ticket.  
As repayment for their help in getting Zuma elected, COSATU and the South African 
Communist Party expected an equal say in the governing of the country, especially 
with regard to determining the economic agenda.108 
A significant shift in the power relations between the partners took place after the 
weakening of the neo-liberal agenda making the voice of organised labour 
increasingly difficult to ignore. 
The resulting influence by labour on the shaping of government policy is considered 
unprecedented and according to Jayendra Naidoo; 
 
has given labour a far bigger bite (at directing national policy) than any 
other system in the world.109  
 
This view is supported by  D’arcy du Toit, Professor of Law at the University of the 
Western Cape where he states;  
 
The trade union movement is a powerful player in the shaping of 
socio-economic policy at national as well as local level. No serious 
attempt at reform is likely to succeed in the face of union opposition.110 
 
The infusion of constitutional values and objectives into the new corporate law was 
bound to create a Companies Act with a broadened focus on the interests of all 
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stakeholders. However, the extent to which employees were prioritised in Chapter 6, 
contrary to the objective in the Guidelines to achieve a balance between the interests 
of all the stakeholders, is evidence of the ascendancy of labour at this time and the 
powerful influence of its agenda, the impact of which will now be assessed on 































4. The impact of employee rights in Chapter 6 on business in general and on 
the rescue of a business in distress 
 
4.1The impact of employee rights in Chapter 6 on business in general 
 
Employee rights in Chapter 6 are so extensive that in some instances they impact on 
the operation of a successful business.  
 
It is a source of some irony that although the core objective of business rescue is the 
preservation of business, some of the rights afforded to employees in Chapter 6 may 
have the effect of undermining the health of a profitable and viable business.  
 
The relationship between employers and employees in South Africa can often be 
described as militantly adversarial111 and it is therefore fair to assume that any 
adjustment to the power relations in this environment may run the risk of producing 
unintended consequences in this volatile and delicate environment.  
 
Section 31(3) of the Act runs this risk by entitling trade unions to; 
  
be given access to company financial statements for purposes of 
initiating a business rescue process. 
 
Although this right is not contained in Chapter 6 it was enacted, in pursuance of the 
objective of transparency, to equip employees to exercise the unique right112 to 
institute business rescue proceedings in terms of Section 131 of the Act. 
 
There is no limit placed on how often this right may be exercised and no liability 
attaches to the union for abuse of this right113 and the use of the word “must” in the 
section means that even if mala fides is suspected neither the court nor the company 
can refuse such request.114 
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It is clear that a very real potential exists thereby, to interfere with the power relations 
between employers and employees by being abused as a bargaining tool by unions 
who would be aware that this demand could result in reputational damage to a 
business and risk to its credit worthiness which management would be keen to 
avoid115 
 
These delicate power relations may be similarly affected by Section 131 of the Act to 
which Section 31 (3) relates, which entitles employees to institute business rescue 
proceedings. This right, according to Anneli Loubser; “has no equivalent in any other 
comparable system.”116   
 
This right may be abused for leverage in negotiations, where an unsatisfactory wage 
settlement based on affordability, could be used as a ground for instituting rescue 
proceedings.117 
This potential for abuse can extend to a situation where even a single employee who 
may be disgruntled, has the right to institute rescue proceedings.  
 
Whilst the likelihood of such an application succeeding is slim where a company is in 
good health, an action such as this is not without serious consequences. 
In terms of Section 132 of the Act, business rescue commences as soon as there is 
an application in terms of Section 131 of the Act;  
 
Business rescue proceedings begin when an affected person applies 
to the court for an order placing the company under supervision… 
 
The first consequence of this is that all affected parties must be notified of this 
application in terms of Section 131 (2)(b) of the Act; 
 
An applicant…must…. notify each affected person of the application in 
the prescribed manner. 
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The impact of such an application on the creditors of a company can serve to 
severely undermine the reputation and creditworthiness118 of a company. In addition 
there is a very real risk that actual damage can arise due to the fact that the 
application for rescue in isolation does not invoke the moratorium as contemplated in 
Section 133 of the Act. This only comes into effect when an order for rescue 
proceedings has been granted by the court. 
In the case of malicious abuse of Section 131 of the Act by a disgruntled employee, 
a moratorium will never come into effect because the order will not be granted. This 
could therefore expose a healthy company to a potentially devastating “run on its 
assets”119 
The potential leverage afforded to employees by the threat of this action should not 
be underestimated. 
 
Another example of the potential of employee privilege afforded in Chapter 6 to 
disrupt and damage a healthy business is found in Section 131 (4) (a) (ii) of the Act 
where employees are elevated to super-creditors.  
As previously stated the commencement of business rescue proceedings has a 
significant reputational impact on a business which may impact on its credit 
worthiness. It should therefore not be undertaken lightly and the grounds required for 
making an application in terms of Chapter 6 should be substantial.  
It is for this reason that the bar is set high in Section 131 read with Section128 (f) of 
the Act which provides that an order shall not be granted in an application to place a 
business into rescue unless the court is satisfied that a business is in distress. This 
requires that a company is either found to be unable to pay its debts or that it will 
become insolvent within the ensuing six months.120 A careful analysis of proven facts 
pertaining to the financial health of the business and its prospect for rescue would be 
required before an order would be granted. 
 
However this judicious approach is undone by Section 131 (3) (a) (ii) of the Act 
which in line with the general prioritisation of employees, the court is simply required 
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to grant an order if it is satisfied that there has been a failure by the business to pay 
any amount owed to an employer arising from a contract or public regulation.  
This is a significant advantaging of a singular interest group in a company which may 
come at the considerable expense of other stakeholders.  
Taken to its logical conclusion, an otherwise healthy company, not financially 
distressed which has failed to make a single payment to a single employee could be 
put at risk through the injudicious exercise of this provision.121 
 
4.2 Employees become active participants in business rescue 
 
It has been established above that employee rights in Chapter 6 have the potential to 
damage healthy business. 
It is now important to assess the impact of these rights on the efficiencies and 
objectives of the rescue procedure itself. 
 
According to Cassim, employees have been “given a vital role in the business rescue 
proceedings”122 in a process that is “consultative and inclusive”123 in nature and have 
thereby become influential participants of business rescue through the many rights 
and privileges afforded to them in Chapter 6.  
 
The merits of employee participation in strategic business activities is a controversial 
subject in general but even more so in the context of the South African industrial 
relations environment.  
It will be important therefore to review some of the opinions of employee participation 
in general and thereafter evaluate the potential effect of employee participation in 
business rescue in the current labour relations environment in South Africa. 
 
4.2.1 Employee participation, the subject of ongoing debate 
 
Participation of employees in corporate governance is often referred to as the; 
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employees’ voice (and) can manifest itself through ownership 
rights….veto rights….requirements to consult or provide information 
on strategic decisions.124  
 
The extent to which employees participate in the affairs of a business will in large 
part depend upon the corporate governance structure adopted by a country. This 
structure is in turn a product of a country’s unique socio-political-legal mix within its 
historical and cultural legacy.125  
Predictably there are many different models and structures of corporate governance 
around the world, and therefore a great variety in the degree of worker participation 
in the corporate affairs of a company.  
 
The subject of employee participation in a company on a strategic level is 
controversial. Some argue that it is highly beneficial whilst others are concerned that 
it is counter-productive because of an inherent conflict of interest between employers 
and employees. 
 
On the one hand those in favour of increased employee participation argue that it 
has a positive effect in helping regulate “the distribution of wealth between labour 
and capital”126 
It can also engender positive attitudes amongst workers through a sense of 
belonging, which leads to greater identification with the ongoing management and 
strategic direction of the business which can translate into increased productivity and 
profitability.127  
 
On the other hand, it is argued that high levels of employee participation may impede 
essential decision-making through employee resistance to remedial actions which 
are regarded as impacting negatively on employee interests but which may be 
required for the ongoing viability of the company.128 
 
                                                          
124
 E Z Geva ‘Corporate Insolvency Law- Employee Participation’ (2011)  12 (2) European Business Organization 
Law Review 319 
125
 ibid 323 
126




 The World Bank Principles and guidelines for effective insolvency (2001) 44 
37 
 
The corporate governance models of countries like the UK and USA are predicated 
on flexibility in the labour market, unencumbered by time consuming consultation 
associated with employee participation.129 
This, it is argued, is regarded as assisting in competitiveness where this high degree 
of corporate flexibility enables swift industrial reorganisation in times of economic 
downturns or “technological developments” thereby engendering innovation and 
sustainability.130 
 
After the collapse of the world economy in 2008, this model came under scrutiny131, 
with increased calls for greater involvement of employees in these liberal economies, 
to curb the perceived excesses and recklessness of management.  
 
4.2.1.1 Arguments for increased employee participation  
 
Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt, a leading voice in support of increased employee 
participation, argues that high levels of employee participation prevent corporate 
short-termism created by shareholders, where they are;  
 
too focused on short-run profits and stock prices, at the expense of 
long-term strategies and investments that would benefit the long-run 
value of the firm, employees, and the American economy at large132  
 
He maintains that employee insight is valuable in the formulation of long-term 
strategies with their access to inside information on the running of the business.  
 
He proposes that employees share common goals with both shareholders and 
management.  
On the one hand they share the goal of “monitoring the management” with 
shareholders because although their investments in the business are rarely capital in 
nature, they are deeply invested with regard to their ongoing livelihood and pensions. 
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They offer alliance value to shareholders through their inside operational knowledge 
thereby assisting them in monitoring and controlling management. 
 
On the other hand employees also offer alliance value to management in the 
potential to pressurise shareholders to make; “investments and do things that insure 
long-run profitability”133 
 
He downplays the advantages of greater corporate flexibility arising from 
subordinated employee participation which he claims; 
 
comes at the expense of employees and long-term investments in 
human capital and relationships.134  
 
Ultimately he maintains that this participation and potential for alliances with the 
other corporate role players will lead to a decrease in the short-termism of quick 
profits and improve a company’s long-term prospects.135 
 
Many of the virtues of high employee participation extolled by Dau Schmidt  are 
reflected in the German model of corporate governance where there is a rich 
tradition of employee voice associated with a socialist co-ordinated market economy.  
It would appear that the Germans are willing to forgo the flexibility of their Anglo-
American counterparts in pursuit of quick profits, to allow engagement with their 
employee stakeholders. This model is predicated on what is known as “patient 
capital” which supports long term projects and allows the economy to focus on and 
retain a skilled workforce during economic downturn.136 
 
According to Eyal Z Geva, industrial relations there are not adversarial but rather 
take the form of partnership where, in times of financial distress, employees are 
embedded in the management and participate in the strategic direction of the 
restructuring.137 
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4.2.1.2    Arguments against increased employee participation 
 
The argument by Professor Dau Schmidt for greater employee participation138 is 
critiqued by Aditi Bagchi on the grounds that corporate performance and the 
promotion of employee interests may frequently be oppositional objectives at 
loggerheads with each other, maintaining that; 
 
Employee voice is not a panacea with which one can reconcile 
genuine conflicts of interest.139 
 
In challenging the views of Dau Schmidt, Bagchi analyses the different forms of 
employee participation. He conceives of three forms of employee voice; 
 
The first is ‘Hard voice’ which is a voice; 
 
in which the speaker may back up the persuasive force of her views 
with some measure of power140  
 
This form of participation provides a direct input into the management and direction 
of a business and the interests of employees themselves141 
 
The second is “Soft voice” which is a more consultative form of participation, 
providing employees the; 
 
ability to engage in dialogue with or provide feedback to the relevant 
decision-makers.142 
 
The third form of employee participation, which Bagchi describes as; “only abstractly 
recognizable as a form of ‘voice’”143, is the right of access to information and it is this 
form of participation that he most supports. 
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“Hard voice”, he argues, where employees participate, usually through their union, is 
not necessarily in the best interests of the company, but usually in the best interests 
of the employees who are able to safeguard their rights and privileges often “at the 
expense of company competitiveness”144 
“Soft voice”, Bagchi suggests, which does not involve the exercise of power by 
employees, is largely inconsequential as it merely creates an opportunity for 
expression without the ability to effect any real changes to the direction of the 
business or the lot of the employees.145 
Suggestions and opinions which constitute this “soft voice” will either be dismissed 
for having no value or would in any case have been taken up by management if 
possessing the ability to contribute to the prosperity of the enterprise.  
 
By contrast, he regards the right to information as the most effective form of worker 
participation. This “voice” presents no conflict of interest but provides employees 
access to important information of the company which provides the ability to make 
important life decisions such whether to join a union, resign or work harder etc. This 
reduces employee vulnerability to the perceived capriciousness of the corporate 
existence.146 
 
In support of Bagchi, Scott Moss argues that employee voice is best directed at 
labour relations and is inappropriate in corporate governance.147 The reason for this 
is that he is of the opinion that employee voice is not necessarily directed at the long-
term well-being of the business where all too often, especially with the involvement 
of heavily politicised unions, short-termism and rampant opportunism is present. 
 
According to the World Bank in its study of effective insolvency procedures, the 
divergent goals between employers and employees become even more problematic 
when there is substantial employee participation in the in the management process 
of a business in distress where worker participation may serve to undermine efforts 
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to “keep the business viable and if possible restore it to profitability’ by possibly 
thwarting “a sharp reduction in the workforce” necessary to achieve this end.148 
 
Of significance to South African business rescue, this article goes on to warn that the 
promotion of a worker agenda through unprecedented employee involvement and 
protection in a business, puts at risk businesses that are labour intensive making 
them “a higher credit risk than capital intensive businesses, which may penalize job 
creation.”149 It mentions at the same time, that globally there has been a reaction to 
the advantaging of “special interests” of a businesses in distress which may have the 
unintended consequence of distorting “normal commercial incentives.” It cautions 
that “insolvency laws should not serve as surrogate social security systems.”150  
 
4.2.2 Employee participation in the South African context 
 
It is interesting to note that the degree of employee participation reflected in Chapter 
6 bears more resemblance to the German co-ordinated market model of employee 
participation admired by Dau Schmidt, than the Anglo-American, liberal market 
approach.  
Perhaps this is not surprising considering the significant influence of labour on these 
provisions who have long promoted Western European systems for work place 
democratisation151as reflected in the Labour Relations Act, which was shaped by this 
strong labour agenda. 
The problem is that South African industrial relations bear no resemblance to the 
German labour environment, with a skilled and educated workforce. German labour 
relations are sophisticated and have developed a co-operative character since 1835 
when worker committees were introduced for the purposes of profit sharing in 
industry. Employee participation reduced significantly under Nazi Germany but again 
revived at the end of the war with the need to rebuild the economy. At first this only 
entailed consultation in certain economic areas, but the Works Constitution Act of 
1972 elevated this participation to co-determination and joint decision-making.152 
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 South African labour relations by contrast, are highly politicized and adversarial in 
nature.153  
In addition, the inherent conflict of interest between employers and employees as 
proposed by Bagchi is present in South African industrial relations where du Toit 
speaks of the; 
 
contradictory interests…(of) employers and workers…(which) compete 
with one another.154 
 
This has been exacerbated by the fact that during the apartheid years, labour 
developed a militant approach which has resulted today in “a highly polarised 
industrial relations system.”155   
 
 It is therefore unsurprising that attempts by the Labour Relations Act to democratise 
the workplace through the creation of work forums which are the South African 
version of the West European work councils, have met with limited success, where, 
according to du Toit; 
 
management and labour habitually make contradictory proposals, 
reach deadlock and move into dispute-resolution mode.156 
 
The fact that workplace democratisation has been relatively unsuccessful under 
normal work conditions must raise questions about the wisdom of providing high 
levels of employee participation during the highly stressful event of business rescue. 
 
The specific impact of these rights of participation in business rescue are now 
analysed in the light of this general critique on employee participation, within the 
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4.2.3 The impact of employee participation in business rescue 
 
Employees derive rights of participation under Chapter 6, firstly as a class on their 
own and secondly through their inclusion in the class “affected persons.”157   
It is this double endowment of rights that places employees at a significant 
advantage to other stakeholders and affords their participation across all the 
catagories of “voice” described by Bagchi.  
It will be useful to examine the extent of these rights of participation with reference to 
his critique of these various employee “voices”.  
 
4.2.3.1 “Soft Voice” employee participation in business rescue 
 
“Soft voice”, which Bagchi describes as being that form of employee participation 
that is not underpinned by power but is rather a form of consultative participation 
which is in his words, unlikely to; 
 
bring about any important changes in methods of corporate 
governance, or even micro-level changes in how a particular plant or 
factory operates158  
 
and is thus relatively ineffectual. 
He argues that there should be no need to legislate for this type of participation as 
management will be likely to implement good ideas from employees in any case. 
 
Examples of “soft voice” participation in chapter 6 are found in Section 144 (3) (d) 
read with Section 152 (1) (c) of the Act which requires that employees be consulted 
by the practitioner during the development of the business rescue plan and be 
afforded time to review the plan and prepare a submission to the meeting constituted 
to consider the plan.  
The positive effect of this provision is that this consultation has the potential to draw 
upon employee innovation and thereby obtain their buy-in and commitment159 to 
plans that may entail the restructuring of the business.  
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The success of this consultation will depend on the degree of co-operation and trust 
that exists between employees and management. In South Africa’s adversarial 
industrial relations environment this is usually at a low level, so this provision may 
therefore have limited value. 
 
It may in addition suffer from the redundancy, described above by Bagchi, which is 
associated with employee voice that comes without power. These consultations 
provide no power to employees to effect changes or reject the plan at this stage. 
Section 149 (1) of the Act, provides that whilst employees; 
 
may consult with the practitioner about any matter relating to the 
business rescue proceedings…’ they  ‘may not direct or instruct the 
practitioner.  
 
Without legal consequences attaching to these sections and in an uncooperative 
labour environment, these consultations are likely to be formalistic and meaningless.   
If on the other hand, the practitioner does perceive a benefit, it is likely that he would 
have consulted with employees in any case, without the need for this to be 
legislated.  
 
4.2.3.2 The Right to Information 
 
Employees are granted extensive right to information in Chapter 6 which, according 
to Bagchi is the best form of employee participation because it provides some 
measure of employee empowerment160 which largely has little impact on the 
strategic direction of the company where, he posits, a conflict of interests can exist 
between employers and employees.  
 
There are many examples of this form of participation in Chapter 6. 
 
Section 144 (3) (a) of the Act ensures employees or their registered union are highly 
informed and apprised of all aspects of the rescue proceedings by providing that 
employees are “entitled to… notice of …each court proceeding, decision, meeting or 
other relevant event concerning the business rescue proceedings”  
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This broad right is reinforced through procedural requirements in the Act relating to 
the provision of information to employees. 
Section 129 of the Act specifies that employees are entitled to receive notification 
within 5 business days of a filed board resolution to commence business rescue 
proceedings together with “the facts relevant to the grounds (upon which) the 
resolution was founded.” 
In addition employees are entitled to receive notice of the appointment of a business 
rescue practitioner within 5 business days of the filing of the appointment.  
 
The primary benefit to this form of employee participation according to Bagchi is that 
employees are provided with the information necessary for them to make decisions 
about their future. 
 
Although this may indeed hold value in an economy with unlimited employment 
opportunities for employees to choose between, this is not the position for the 
majority of employees in South Africa where employment opportunities are limited 
and job seekers are plentiful. The degree of empowerment through information is 
therefore debatable in the South African context.  
 
It is therefore unlikely that the drafters of Chapter 6 regarded the provision of 
information as an end in itself but rather provided it as a means to the exercise of the 
many “hard voice” rights provided to employees in this Chapter.  
 
4.2.3.3 “Hard Voice” employee participation in business rescue 
 
“Hard voice” holds real power for employees by providing the ability to effect change 
and influence process.  
Bagchi is critical of ‘hard voice’ participation believing that the absence of unity of 
purpose by parties with conflicting interests will ultimately undermine corporate 
success. 
 
As has been discussed previously, the policy underpin of the new Companies Act in 
general and business rescue in particular is the recognition of a broader group of 
stakeholder interests, with employees in many instances, specifically prioritised. It is 
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therefore no surprise that Chapter 6 is replete with examples of “hard voice” for 
employees. 
 
The most influential example of “hard voice” participation is provided by Section 
131of the Act which allows employees through their classification as “affected 
person”, to make an application to place a company under supervision.  
As previously discussed, there is a real potential that this right could be abused for 
the purpose of interfering with the power relations between employers and 
employees.  
However, in the matter Solar Spectrum Trading 83 (Pty) Ltd v AFGRI Operations 
Limited and Solar Spectrum Trading 83 (Pty) Ltd161, the employees of a company in 
distress which was in the process of being liquidated, successfully applied for the 
company to be placed under supervision. The application had the effect of 
suspending the liquidation proceedings. 
The court weighed up the interests of the secured creditor in reducing its risk of 
further depletion of the company assets through immediate liquidation with the 
interests of the employees whose livelihood depended on the preservation of the 
business and ruled for the employees on evidence presented that the business was 
in the process of recovering. 
 
Whilst this was a legitimate and productive exercise of the an employee right to 
suspend liquidation proceedings if commenced, in terms of Section 131 (6) of the 
Act, there is a real potential that this right could be abused due to the fact that 
employees obtain considerably better rights under business rescue which are later 
transferred to insolvency proceedings if the rescue attempt fails.  
  
Employees are also afforded the right to object to rescue proceedings in terms of 
Section 130 (1) (a) of the Act where it is believed that a company is not in financial 
distress or is unable to be rescued or there are procedural problems with the 
application. They are also able to apply to set aside the appointment of a practitioner 
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in terms of Section 130 (1) (b) of the Act or require that a practitioner provide 
security. 
In many respects these employee rights of participation serve to ameliorate the 
concerns raised by labour of the cynical abuse of insolvency proceedings by 
management and shareholders and the appointment of practitioners which are 
biased in the favour of creditors.  
 
Section 144 (3) (b) of the Act broadly empowers employees to “participate in any 
court proceedings arising during business rescue proceedings.” This allows 
employees to remain actively involved and informed on all aspects throughout the 
process. 
 
Employees are assigned a particularly active role in the preparation and acceptance 
of a business rescue plan once proceedings have commenced.  
As previously discussed, there is “soft voice” consultation with employees prior to the 
production of the plan, followed by the right to participate in the meeting convened 
10 business days after the publication of the plan where a representative has the 
right to address this meeting prior to the vote of acceptance. This holds no real 
potential for power and is merely influential in nature. 
However if a plan is rejected, a “hard voice” component of participation kicks in, 
where employees are empowered through Section 153 of the Act to apply to set 
aside a vote of rejection of a plan, call for the practitioner to prepare and publish a 
revised plan or offer to purchase the voting interest of “one or more persons who 
opposed adoption.”  
On the face of it this seems to be a reasonable right for employees determined to 
preserve a business in distress. However, in light of the super-priority ranking of 
employee costs during rescue proceedings, these rights could be abused to prolong 
the proceedings and deplete the assets of the business at the expense of creditors 
to the business. 
 
It is evident from this study of Chapter 6, that employees have been afforded all 
forms of “voice” in business rescue proceedings, in terms of Bagchi’s analysis of 




will almost certainly lead to protracted hearings and escalating costs, 
especially in the case of larger companies, because of the adversarial 
nature that now characterises the procedure162,  
 
She concludes that the level of employee participation in South Africa is unparalleled 
in comparable legal jurisdictions.163 
 
In England the rights of participation in proceedings are limited to the applicant and 
the company as represented by one or more of the directors. In some circumstances 
the court may on application, agree to extend the right of participation to interested 
parties. Specific involvement of employees is not provided for and their voice as a 
class is mute.164  
The position is similar in Australia where apart from the right to vote at the creditors 
meeting in their capacity as creditors, employees generally play an insignificant role 
in the procedure. 
There is even less employee participation in Chapter 11 proceedings in the United 
States where under normal circumstances there is not even a duty on an employer 
to notify employees of an impending petition for Chapter 11 unless it can be proved 
that there were mala fides on behalf of the employer.165  
Employees play a relatively minor role in Chapter 11 proceedings. They can neither 
initiate proceedings nor object to the initiation thereof and they may only participate 
in proceedings in the capacity of an unsecured creditor for any monies that may be 
outstanding. 
In addition, employees may not participate on an individual basis and may only vote 
as a class and even this right of participation is not unlimited, where for instance, 
objections by employees as a class to the acceptance of a rescue plan, can be 
disregarded and the plan imposed upon them regardless of dissent; “so long as it 
does not discriminate unfairly and is fair and equitable”166 
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It is probable that this limitation on employee participation in these jurisdictions is to 
avoid the dilatory impact arising from “tension and conflict” which, according to 
Cassim, may occur between stakeholders whose interests are often diametrically 
opposed to each other, in proceedings that are “consultative and inclusive” in 
nature.167  
 
This limitation on employee participation in the United States is considered 
necessary to streamline the process by removing the potential for disruption and 
derailment by too many participating parties168 in order to expedite the process and 
thereby lower; 
 
both direct and indirect financial distress costs, lessen(ing) the risk 
that the restructuring will fail altogether169  
 
and end up as a liquidation. 
 
South Africa on the other hand has provided employees in terms of Sections 
130,131, 135, 136, 144 and 152 of the Act the rights to be notified, to initiate, to 
object to proceedings, form committees, be consulted on the plan, allowed to 
propose an alternative plan, object to and remove a practitioner and generally 
participate, even on an individual basis. 
This makes employees central participants in business rescue.  
In a co-operative labour climate these rights of participation would, according to Dau 
Schmidt, enhance a rescue process through the unique operational knowledge of 
employees and their long term view. 
 
However Bagchi’s view of the inherent conflicting interests of employers and 
employees, in the context of South Africa’s adversarial labour environment, would 
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4.3 Employee protection and the impact on the flexibility to restructure 
 
If employees are “considered the lost souls in insolvency law”170 this is certainly not 
the case in business rescue 
Employees derive considerable protection from Section 136 (1)(a) of the Act which 
provides that employment contracts remain in force and may only be altered subject 
to the prevailing labour laws.171  
 
The Labour Relations Act is predicated on a high degree of employee consultation 
and participation and this is evident in the sections dealing with retrenchment and 
restructuring. This degree of engagement is of course complex and time consuming 
requiring; 
 
meaningful joint consensus-seeking process and attempt to reach consensus on 
appropriate measures- 
 to avoid the dismissals; 
 to minimise the number of dismissals; 
 to change the timing of the dismissals; and 
 to mitigate the adverse effects of the dismissals; 
 the method for selecting the employees to be dismissed; and 
 the severance pay for dismissed employees.172 
 
The sections require the disclosure information and substantial consultation and 
negotiation with unions or labour representatives. Consultation is in itself time 
consuming and the process may be further protracted through the referral of 
disputes to the CCMA or the labour court.173 For large companies with over 50 
employees the position is even worse where the intention to downsize can be 
resisted via strike action.174 In addition, a failure to adhere to the provisions in 
Sections 189 and 189A175 could result in the employees being deemed to have been 
dismissed unfairly on operational requirements which would expose a company to 
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the liability “for compensation up to an amount equal to the employees’ remuneration 
for 12 months”176  
 
The delays resulting from this ‘meaningful joint consensus seeking’ approach, in 
addition to the prospect of further delays in the event of a dispute being declared 
could, according to Anneli Loubser; “have an extremely adverse effect on a company 
already teetering on the brink of collapse.”177 
 
This is because labour costs generally constitute the largest expense in a business 
and restrictions in the ability to swiftly reduce costs in this area can jeopardise an 
effective strategy to stabilise a business in distress. 
 
The process of downsizing a workforce in England is far less complicated and thus 
quicker to implement.  
An administrator is afforded 14 days to decide on the dismissal of employees. If 
during this period employees are dismissed, they become “ordinary creditors within 
the administration so will line up along suppliers and other creditors.”178 If they are 
not dismissed during this period, they go on to become a preferential creditor and if 
the business does not survive the rescue attempt, and proceeds to insolvency, this 
preferent claim relates to the unpaid salary owed up to 4 months “immediately 
preceding the insolvency” and is also subject to an upper limit which is determined 
from time to time.179 
Furthermore employees are subjected to the moratorium on claims against a 
business under administration and are prohibited from making claims without 
consent of either the courts or the administrator.180  
 
In Australia, whilst there is some degree of protection of contracts of employment in 
their rescue process, there is considerably less than that afforded by the South 
African system. 
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The Australian practitioner is afforded the discretion to alter these contracts in the 
process of restructuring the business. This discretion was clarified in the Patricks 
case181  where; the  
 
High court made it clear that a fundamental aspect of the 
administrator’s task was to operate the company as he or she saw fit 
and that accordingly even where there were possible breaches of 
industrial legislation, it was not prepared to order that employees must 
be retained.182 
 
The United States is generally characterised by a relatively unregulated labour 
market with many employees employed on an “at will’ basis”183 which allows either 
party to terminate the employment relationship at any time without complicated 
procedures. 
It follows therefore that a business which has filed for Chapter 11, may with very little 
procedural impediment, embark upon swift and dramatic reorganisation through 
dismissals. The only requirement in these circumstances is that these dismissals are 
non-discriminatory and comply with any contractual legal notice that may exist.184 
 
The position is a little more complicated if the employment relationship is governed 
by an employment contract.  As part of the protection afforded by a Chapter 11 
bankruptcy filing, a business is entitled to 
 
assume or reject executory contracts subject to a bankruptcy court’s 
approval and provided certain requirements are satisfied.185 
 
The test to determine whether a contract is executory or not is whether there are 
obligations to perform from either party at the time of filing the petition. Employment 
contracts are generally viewed as executory contracts due to the obligation to 
perform on both parties. Businesses undergoing Chapter 11 proceedings are thus 
entitled to assume or reject these contracts. However these rights are not unfettered 
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and decisions to reject or alter employment contract agreement are subject the 
oversight of a bankruptcy court which will base its approval of a business decision to 
reject or assume these contracts upon whether it was based on “sound business 
judgement and whether the interests of other creditors will be prejudiced.”186 
 
Collective bargaining agreements are also viewed as executory contracts and are 
also subject to rejection or assumption by the debtor. There are however more 
onerous conditions attaching to the rejection of collective bargaining agreements 
where decisions are subject to Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy Code187 
There is also a requirement that the business engages with the relevant Union 
representative and makes a proposal on a potential restructuring. Should this 
proposed restructuring or rejection of the bargaining agreement be opposed by the 
Union without good cause and if, in a Bankruptcy court’s view, the rejection or 
alteration of such bargaining agreement is favourable on a balance of equities, then 
the changes or rejection of this agreement will be allowed. 
 
An employee claim arising from a successful rejection of an employment contract or 
bargaining agreement will rank alongside other unsecured claims in a potential 
liquidation and this claim will in addition be subject to an upper limit as determined by 
Section 502 (b)(7) of the Bankruptcy Code.188 
 
It is clear from an analysis of the flexibility in restructuring in these foreign 
jurisdictions that the ability to restructure under the South African system is burdened 
with a high degree of inflexibility.  
The US system is more flexible than any of the other jurisdictions but the benefits 
arising from this flexibility, does not come without controversy. 
There is criticism that US employees are particularly vulnerable as a class of 
creditors where although in theory employees are provided with limited rights of 
participation potentially through their classification as unsecured creditors; 
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in practice the special relationship between employer and employee 
will silence the employee stakeholder and cause them to be less 
protective of their rights189  
 
Even the procedural protection of employee rights under a collective bargaining 
agreement provided by Section 1113 of the Bankruptcy code sets a very low bar for 
the adjudication of a decision to reject such an agreement and thereby encourages 
unions to avoid high-risk, hard-line positions and rather elect to discharge their; 
 
fiduciary duty to its membership…to protect the most jobs for the most 
Union members190 
 
Ironically the requirement to consult with employees protected under a collective 
bargaining agreement “was established with the vision of the Wagner Act and the 
New Deal reforms at its core”191 which were enacted in 1935 and were “the most 
pro-worker laws ever enacted by the Federal Government.”192 However 
notwithstanding this apparent protection of employee rights through collaboration 
between organised labour and management on the future and direction of a 
distressed business , Chapter 11 has become “the managerial avenue of choice for 
cross-industry restructuring…”193 This has served to severely weaken the collective 
bargaining mechanism through the practice of “strategic bankruptcies”194 which 
exploit the system enabling  
 
an employer to avoid substantial legacy and benefit costs, reject 
collective bargaining agreements, and drastically reduce labor 
costs.195 
 
It is apparent that the extra-ordinary protection of employee rights in Chapter 6 would 
be held in high regard by these critics of Chapter 11, but the fact remains that swift 
and effective savings that can be made to the labour costs of a distressed business 
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holds the most potential “to change its fortunes going forward”196where, 
paradoxically, less protection presents a greater prospect for the preservation of 
employment.  
 
Although slightly off point but demonstrating the relationship between protection and 
employment, a paper which examined and compared labour market flexibility with 
job creation across the various states in the US, authors Bauer and Lee concluded 
that; 
 
Higher rates of flexibility are correlated with higher growth rates for 
both output and employment197 
 
Whilst closer to home Tendai and Moyo in their study of the impact of employment 
protection on job creation, conclude in their investigation and analysis of a large 
sample of companies from six African countries, that;  
 
restrictive labour market regulations are detrimental to export 
propensity, export intensity, investment and employment.198  
 
It seems as if the drafters of Chapter 6 prioritised stronger employee protection in a 
business in distress, rather than the provision of an enabling environment for a 
business to take swift steps when necessary, to downsize in order to effect a 
recovery. 
 
4.4 Employee privilege and the impact on post commencement financing. 
 
It would appear, according to Professor Marius Pretorius who will be undertaking the 
review of the rescue provisions on behalf of the committee established by DTI, that 
one of the most important  issues affecting the efficacy of the procedure has to do 
with resistance by the banks; “especially (their) ‘withholding (of)  finance once the 
rescue process had begun.”199  
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It will be important to understand the reasons for this lack of enthusiasm for business 
rescue by the banks which generally constitute a key stakeholder in most 
businesses. 
 
Almost invariably, the single most important aspect of rescue is the ability to secure 
turnaround finance in order to restore the company to health200It is, in the words of a 
respondent in a survey conducted by Wanya du Preez in her thesis on post 
commencement finance; 
 
probably the most fundamental leg to the process, without it,  it is 
stillborn…. it’s like the oxygen tank for the patient. Without the oxygen 
he is going down.201 
 
This is point is further emphasised by Thekiso Lefifi in an article in Business Day 
Live where he states that; 
 
without post commencement finance(PCF), business rescue was akin 
to a boat without a paddle, leaving the few companies that had the 
option of saving their business without any hope.202 
 
Although PCF is critical to the success of business rescue, empirical findings 
conducted by Wanya du Preez in her study on this subject; “confimed that the 
current level of PCF in South Africa is non-existent.”203 
 
Whilst there are a number of reasons for theses low levels, amongst them being that 
the law is still relatively new and “processes are not clear (with) many loopholes and 
inefficiencies”204 and that banks are too powerful and haven’t bought into the 
process, one of the top reasons for this state of affairs has to do with “concerns and 
uncertainty regarding the priority ranking of post commencement financing”205 
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In terms of section 135(3)(b) of the Act it appeared as if PCF ranked behind secured 
creditors, the costs of the process and claims relating to costs of employment during 
the period.  
However a recent interpretation of this section in the Merchant West206decision 
handed down in the South Gauteng High Court, the position of post commencement 
finance was improved by ranking it ahead of secured creditors. This improvement in 
the status of post commencement financiers, could have a positive impact on the 
encouragement of this industry but Professor Marius Pretorius, claimed that was still 
uncertainty surrounding the; 
 
definition and interpretation of what constitutes PCF (and that it would 
be) critical that such uncertainty be clarified in order to provide 
potential financiers with the confidence that their funding will be 
recognised as a higher priority debt and the certainty that their debt 
will be repaid.207  
 
An unintended consequence of this decision to prioritise PCF, may be a disruption to 
the commercial certainty of secured creditors. This may lead to higher lending costs 
to offset the heightened risk or subdue the lending industry altogether.  
It may also discourage existing secured creditors from supporting an application for 
rescue as there is substantial risk that the value of the business will be undermined 
by the introduction of superior new claims against the assets of an already 
distressed company. These creditors will therefore be incentivised to proceed 
directly to liquidation to better protect their interests. 
 
In a comparative review of employee claims treatment in insolvency systems in 
South Africa, US Aid restates the World Bank International Insolvency standards,  
warning of the risks involved in the disruption of normal commercial relationships and 
notwithstanding its recognition of the vulnerability of employees promotes a balanced 
treatment of employee rights and the interests of other creditors, to ensure that;  
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confidence in the commercial sector through greater enforceability of 
bargained for contractual and collateral rights (is maintained) so as to 
support access to finance.208 
 
The study goes on to add that the vast majority of countries typically recognise and 
give effect to secured rights in an insolvency proceeding and relegate employee 
claims to a preferential position below secured and administrative claims.209 
 
Similar sentiments are expressed by the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law which warns that these ranking priorities; 
 
should be based on commercial bargains and not reflect social and 
political concerns that have the potential to distort outcomes of 
insolvency. According priority to claims that are not based on 
commercial bargains should be minimised.210 
 
It is important to recognise as previously discussed, that any resultant commercial 
uncertainty arising from an undermining of commercial bargains could deter 
investment, particularly in commercial undertakings which require a large workforce. 
 
Despite these potential problems, the decision in Merchant West has improved the 
status of post commencement financiers, however the problem exists that these 
claims still rank behind the costs of the actual process and the uncapped claim of 
employee costs during the rescue period. In light of the fact that some of the more 
strenuous criticisms of business rescue is the “incompetence of practitioners” 
coupled with claims that some are also unscrupulous211, the rescue period can be 
significantly protracted resulting in an erosion of new finance by the ongoing 
employment costs, particularly in the case of distressed companies with a large 
workforce which are the very entities from a socio-political perspective, most in need 
of rescue.  
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It is clear that banks, the most likely source of PCF, are unlikely to be attracted to 
developing a PCF industry under current conditions. 212  
 
Once again it would appear that in the legislators’ eagerness to protect employee 
rights, an essential element of rescue has been undermined which has the effect of 
reducing the effectiveness of the procedure to save the business and protect 
employment.     
 
With access to the best practices and legislation around the world aimed at the 
encouragement of post commencement financing, the failure of South African 
legislators to prioritise PCF ahead of employee claims appears to have been driven 
by considerations other than the main objective of the rescue of a business.  
 
It is also evidence of the power dynamics that were involved in the legislative 
process which, according to Anneli Loubser is a clear example of an interest group, 
in this instance labour, driving an agenda focussed “only on their own interests”213 
where in fact there should have been; 
 
one test, and that is whether a particular provision or measure would 
increase the chances of a successful rescue…because that (would) 
ultimately be to the advantage of everybody.214 
 
 
It would appear that South Africa is not alone in failing to provide the right legal 
infrastructure to promote the development of the post commencement finance 
industry.  
The English rescue system does not have a well-developed post commencement 
financing environment because, like South Africa, there is no concept of super-
priority status for post commencement financiers.215 
 
                                                          
212
 W du Preez (note 7 above) 
213




 W du Preez (note 7 above;67) 
60 
 
In general financing during this period emanates from existing creditors216 and due to 
the reluctance of these creditors to further increase their risk, the development of 
PCF has tended to be discouraged.217 
Efforts have been made in the Enterprise Act of 2002 to encourage this type of 
financing, by providing the administrator with the power of “borrowing money and 
granting security on the organisation’s behalf.”218 While this does not provide greater 
priority than other secured creditors, secured post commencement financiers enjoy 
higher priority than the costs of administration and employee claims. 
 
Australia, like England and South Africa, has muted success in promoting “life blood” 
financing for a business in distress. Australia has also not provided “super-priority 
ranking for funding advanced to assist in the rehabilitation process.”219  
This prevents the development of a separate financing industry specialising in post 
commencement finance as is found in the USA.  According  to Michael Blazic, the 
primary lenders to distressed businesses will more than likely be banks already 
exposed to the failing business who will then be more likely to behave 
 
in a manner highly motivated and focused on negotiating strategies 
that protect their existing exposure and interests220 
 
rather than the successful rescue of such an entity. 
 
By contrast, Chapter 11 in the United States has a highly functional system of PCF 
resulting in the development of a financial industry specifically focussed on this form 
of financing. 
 
It appears that legislators there have recognised that the most important 
consideration for the development of a flourishing PCF industry is to provide legal 
mechanisms to mitigate the inherent risk of extending credit to an entity in distress. 
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Chapter 11 deals with this dilemma by according post commencement financiers 
with super-priority status which ensures that these lenders to a company in distress 
are amongst the first to be repaid. This, together with an attractive interest rate 
serves to balance the ratio of risk to reward which is essential to promotion of this 
financial industry. 
 
What is interesting is that although post commencement financiers in the US enjoy 
an elevated status, they do not rank ahead of secured creditors, in contrast to the 
recent South African decision in Merchant West  
 
It would appear that the US system strikes the right balance. Although secured 
creditors enjoy the highest protection (thereby creating financial predictability and 
reliability in the macro financing system) new financiers of a distressed business can 
secure enhanced status by either categorising the new loans under an administrative 
expense which rank third after secured creditors and priority creditors or can elect to 
occupy an even more favourable position provided by Section 364(d) where such 
claims are ranked second, immediately after secured claims.221 
This promotes the development of the post commencement finance industry without 
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5. The impact of employee rights on the return to creditors after failed rescue  
 
The purpose of Chapter 6 is twofold. The first is the rescue of a business in distress 
and the second, if this is not possible, is to obtain 
 
a better return for the company’s creditors or shareholders than would 
result from an immediate liquidation of the company 
 
 in terms of Section 128 of the Act. 
In light of this objective, it will be necessary to compare the rights of employees 
under the Insolvency Act with the corresponding rights accruing to employees in 
business rescue in order to evaluate the extent to which this objective is achieved.  
 
5.1 The impact of employee rights in Chapter 6 on the sale of a business as a 
going concern 
 
In the event of a failure to restore a distressed business to health, one of the key 
strategies to realise maximum value for all stakeholders is to sell the business as a 
going concern rather than liquidate its assets in a piecemeal fashion.222 It is therefore 
important to make the sale of a business in distress as attractive as possible. 
 
An impediment to this arises in the form of Section 197 of the Labour Relations Act 
which provides as follows; 
 
If a transfer of a business takes place, unless otherwise agreed… 
 the new employer must take over all of the employees on the same 
conditions of service 
 the rights of the employees who are transferred workers (such as 
unpaid salary) and duties apply to new employer 
 everything done by the old employer (such as unfair dismissal) is 
transferred to the new employer 
 and the transfer does not interrupt the continuity of service.223  
 
In the case of the sale of a business in distress considerable liability could therefore 
attach to a new owner. 
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It is for this reason that, in terms of Section 197A of the insolvency Act,224 the sale of 
a business in liquidation proceedings provides exemption to the new owner from 
 
any liability for claims the employees may have had against the 




 claims that employees may have had against their old employers in 
respect of unpaid salary and unpaid leave do not transfer to the new 
employer; and  
 the new employer cannot be held liable for the unfair dismissal of any 
of the employer’s former employees.226 
 
Business rescue does not provide this indemnity to potential buyers of a distressed 
business. The preferent position provided to employees after a failed rescue attempt 
will impact significantly on the value to creditors. The reason for this is that the 
liabilities arising from employee claims may render a business unattractive, which 
would require, at best, the value of the business to be substantially discounted to 
attract a sale. At worst, these liabilities may completely destroy the possibility of 
selling the business as a going concern requiring a piecemeal liquidation.  
In both scenarios, the value destruction arising from the improved employee rights in 
business rescue would have defeated the objective of the Act to obtain a better value 
for creditors than an immediate liquidation.  
 
5.2 The impact of employee rights in Chapter 6 on employee claims 
 
Employee claims against the assets of a business in distress, during rescue also 
serve to undermine the “superior return to creditor” objective of the Act. 
 
The Insolvency Act provides limits on claims by employees against an insolvent 
estate. In the first instance; 
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all contracts of service with its employees are automatically and 
immediately suspended and then terminated 45 days after the date of 
appointment of a final liquidator227  
 
There is thus an immediate arrest of potential claims arising from the contracts of 
employment. 
In addition to limiting ongoing claims against an insolvent business, Section 98 of the 
Insolvency Act no 24 of 1936 limits employee claims against the balance of the free 
residue of the insolvent estate to; “salary and wages (salary 3months), leave pay, 
and severance pay”228 which are capped at an upper limit which is determined from 
time to time by the Minister. 
 
In contrast, Section 144 (2) of the Act provides that any monies owed to employees, 
in terms of their contract of employment, prior to the commencement of business 
rescue proceedings, entitles employees to become preferred unsecured creditors. 
Unlike the position under the Insolvency Act, there is no time limit on how far back 
the claim may extend, nor is there an upper limit imposed on the total claim. In 
addition to this, the priority rankings place the business rescue practitioner, the costs 
of the process and an uncapped claim for all employee costs during the period of 
rescue ahead of all other creditors with theoretically; “no limit on either the amount or 
period for which they must be paid.”229 
 
This would have a considerable impact on other unsecured creditors who would 
have been in a far better position than if they had proceeded to immediately liquidate 
the business contrary to the objective contained in Section 128 (b) (3) of the Act  
 
With only a 12% success rate for businesses that embark upon rescue, it means that 
the balance of about 88% that do not succeed are likely to have placed creditors in a 
worse position than if they had moved immediately to liquidate.  
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In light of these significant advantages obtained by employees under business 
rescue, it must be borne in mind that they have been given the power to convert 
insolvency proceedings to business rescue proceedings through Section 131 (6) of 
the Act. 
 
Whilst the precondition that there must “be a reasonable prospect for rescuing the 
company”230 this may be undermined by the fact that, according to Professor 
Barnard in a recent article in Business Day Live;  
 
One of the weaknesses of the South African system… was that it had 
no dedicated courts with specialist judges (which) resulted in 
contradictory judgments being handed down; ‘Every time a judge is 
appointed he might never have seen a case of business rescue and 
has to start from scratch.’231  
 
The real risk exists therefore, that an inexperienced judge may fail to recognise that 
there is no prospect for the rescue of a distressed business in an application by 
employees to convert insolvency proceedings into a business rescue. 
 
This potent provision, providing employees with the power to radically alter their 
circumstances has the potential for exploitation through the ability of employees to 
convert a legitimate liquidation into a business rescue to place themselves in a better 
position. 
 
It appears that the impact of the extra-ordinary rights afforded to employees in 
Chapter 6 not only undermines healthy business and reduces the efficiency of the 
rescue procedure but also results in reduced value accruing to creditors than if a 
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It may be said that the privileging of employees in Chapter 6 was a triumph of 
idealism above pragmatism, paradoxically undermining the very security of 
employment that these rights set out to achieve. 
 
Liquidations which were on an upward trajectory prior to the corporate law reform 
project in 2004, made the provision of an effective rescue mechanism a national 
priority, to retain “productive capacity”232 and prevent the job destruction that resulted 
from the liquidation of these distressed businesses. Judicial management was no 
defence against this rising trend in insolvencies which was taking a toll economically 
and socially.  
 
However, this privilege and protection provided to employees in the new South 
African rescue procedure has undermined many of the key elements that are 
necessary for successful business rescue. 
 
In the first instance the empowerment of employees in this process has introduced a 
level of participation ill-suited to the current climate of industrial relations in the 
country. It is unlikely in this environment that these high levels of participation are 
able to advance synergies between employees and employers and may instead 
exacerbate the inherent conflict of interests between these two parties. 
  
Abuse of some of the provisions by employees holds the risk of destabilising delicate 
power relation in the work environment, potentially imperilling even healthy business 
and almost certainly leading to costly delays in a rescue process that relies on a 
speedy resolution for success.  
 
Restructuring which is a fundamental part of the process is predicated on speed and 
flexibility. Unfortunately, the wholesale infusion of labour legislation to regulate this 
process undermines these requirements and denies the procedure of important 
strategies for optimal efficiency.  
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The super-prioritisation of employee claims has introduced commercial uncertainty in 
the lending industry and resulted in a poor uptake by banks to develop a post 
commencement finance industry, without which rescue proceedings are inevitably 
doomed to failure. 
 
In addition the impact of employee rights has not only jeopardised the rescue of a 
business, but has also undermined the secondary objective contained in Section 
128, where creditors are generally placed in a worse position after rescue 
proceedings than if they had resorted to liquidation proceedings immediately.   
 
 It seems inexplicable that the efficiency of a procedure, so necessary for economic 
and social reasons could have been compromised by the prioritisation of the 
interests of employees.  
In this regard however, it is important to realise that law is ultimately the product of 
the society in which it is made, and therefore, in this instance, subject to the various 
influences and dictates of modern South Africa.233 
 
Subordination of the new corporate law philosophy to the constitutional framework 
resulted in a re-conceptualisation of the purpose of a company which, without 
abandoning the shareholder value approach, permitted a wider recognition of the 
interests of other stakeholders in a company even, at times, as ends in themselves.  
 
In this broader conceptualisation of a company it was necessary, in the development 
of a rescue mechanism, to obtain a balance between the competing interests and 
objectives of the stakeholders of a distressed business, which according to 
UNICTRAL, would “generally be the primary objective for most jurisdictions”234  
  
However, the prioritisation of employee rights demonstrates that this proved to be a 
daunting task for South African legislators in the context of the complicated power 
relations prevailing at the time of the reform process. 
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Labour in particular, which typically bears the brunt of liquidations, was agitating for 
insolvency law reform which needed to include an effective rescue system to better 
protect employees.  
 
Employee empowerment, privilege and protection which was high on the labour 
agenda found expression in pro-labour rescue legislation with the incorporation of 
employee rights that in some respects, have no equal in other jurisdictions.  
  
This demonstrates the substantial influence of organised labour which was able to 
graft rights which produced a “greater ‘voice”235 for employees and more labour 
protection, typically associated with co-ordinated market economies such as 
Germany and Scandinavia, onto a rescue system modelled on the US Chapter 11 
which is a product of a liberal market economy, predicated on high labour-market 
flexibility.     
The incongruity of infusing this labour protection and privilege, associated with 
socialist economies, into a system which is based on free-market labour flexibility is 
a microcosmic reflection of the ideological conflict and constantly vacillating power 
relations within the government, arising from incompatibilities within the tripartite 
alliance. 
 
According to Niccoli Nattrass, this ideological conflict has; 
 
entrenched (an) oppositional relationship between macroeconomic 
and labour-market policy making at the heart of the state236  
 
This conflict is visible in the Guidelines where it is apparent that policies therein, 
were influenced by a clash between the socialist alliance, as represented by 
organised labour on the one hand, which promotes; “a developmental state tasked 
with disciplining capital and promoting decent work at relatively big wages”237 with 
the neoliberal alliance on the other hand, which promotes flexible labour policies and 
very little state interference. 
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This debilitating contestation of ideas has resulted in policy incoherence which is at 
the heart of the dysfunction of Chapter 6 where the extra-ordinary protection of 
employees has removed the working parts of Chapter 11. This is largely why the 
process has under-performed upon its potential. 
 
It would appear that the importance of creating an effective rescue system to 
promote a stable corporate environment and ameliorate the seemingly intractable 
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